security

Security architecture

VibeCoderKit handles the source of truth for your engineering process. We treat it accordingly. Below: 20 baseline principles plus threat model summary.

20 baseline principles

S1
Vault stays on user device by default
Free tier never uploads vault content; only metadata flows to SaaS.
S2
Cloud backups encrypted at rest
R2 bucket-side AES-256; per-tenant prefix; signed URL only.
S3
Per-tenant DOs, no shared state
Each user gets dedicated DO instances; no cross-tenant memory.
S4
Auth by Clerk + 2FA encouraged
OAuth (GitHub) + email magic link; 2FA available; sessions short-lived.
S5
API tokens scoped + revocable
Per-token scope and expiry; revoke from Settings; audit log on Pro+.
S6
Surface relay token rotation
Per-device relay tokens; rotate from Settings → Surface Devices.
S7
Vector memory isolation
CF Vectorize index per vault; no cross-vault retrieval.
S8
BYOK for LLM keys (optional)
Pro+ may bring their own OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini keys; stored encrypted.
S9
Webhook signatures
Outgoing webhooks signed HMAC-SHA256; verify on receiver.
S10
Probe execution sandbox
HTTP probes run in CF Workers; no shell. SSH probes run in jump-server VM.
S11
CSP + HSTS + COOP
Strict CSP; HSTS preload; COOP for OAuth popup hardening.
S12
No third-party analytics on free tier
Free tier opts out of all 3p trackers; logs minimised.
S13
GDPR / CCPA data export
One-click ZIP export covers vault + metadata + audit log.
S14
Right to erasure
Account delete purges DOs / R2 / Vectorize within 30 days.
S15
Penetration test annually
Phase 3 + 6 months: external pen-test; report summary published.
S16
CVE response < 7 days
Critical CVEs in dependencies patched within 7 days; disclosed in /status.
S17
Open security disclosure
security.txt at /.well-known/security.txt; disclosure via [email protected].
S18
Audit log (Pro+)
Login / API token / vault edit events; 90-day retention; CSV export.
S19
Backup integrity checks
Daily SHA-256 verification of R2 snapshots; mismatch alerts ops.
S20
Sub-processor list maintained
Cloudflare · Clerk · Lemon Squeezy · Resend; published at /legal/dpa.

Threat model (summary)

  • Tenant isolation breakage (mitigated by per-tenant DO + Vectorize index)
  • Relay token theft (mitigated by short TTL + rotation UI)
  • Vector memory poisoning (Pro+ audit log; per-step provenance)
  • LLM prompt injection from vault content (sandboxed agent runtime; tool allowlist)
  • OAuth callback hijack (Clerk hardened; COOP enforced)
  • Backup unauthorised read (R2 signed URL; key never persisted client-side)
Disclose a vulnerability
Email [email protected] with reproducer. Response < 24h on weekdays. PGP key at /.well-known/security.txt.